Bard College

Bard Digital Commons
Senior Projects Spring 2021

Bard Undergraduate Senior Projects

Spring 2021

The Effect of Remittances on Ethnic Tension
Suyog Shrestha
Bard College, ss9211@bard.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.bard.edu/senproj_s2021
Part of the Development Studies Commons, Growth and Development Commons, and the Other
Political Science Commons

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Recommended Citation
Shrestha, Suyog, "The Effect of Remittances on Ethnic Tension" (2021). Senior Projects Spring 2021. 199.
https://digitalcommons.bard.edu/senproj_s2021/199

This Open Access is brought to you for free and open
access by the Bard Undergraduate Senior Projects at
Bard Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Senior Projects Spring 2021 by an authorized
administrator of Bard Digital Commons. For more
information, please contact digitalcommons@bard.edu.

The Effect of Remittances on Ethnic Tension

Senior Project submitted to
The Division of Science, Mathematics, and Computing
and
The Division of Social Studies
of
Bard College

by
Suyog Shrestha

Annandale-on-Hudson, New York
May, 2021

Abstract

With the massive increase in global remittances in the recent decades, migration study has gained a lot
of attention from scholars in social sciences. In particular, the effect of remittances on various socioeconomic variables have been studied. Furthering this literature, we study the effects of remittances on
ethnic tension. Using the Ordinary Least Squares with Panel-Corrected Standard Errors, we find that i)
remittances has less impact on ethnic tension in countries with lower variance of ethnic tension than
those with higher variance ii) remittances increases ethnic tension in countries that already have higher
ethnic tension than the global mean, whereas it lowers ethnic tension in countries that have lower ethnic
tension than the global mean.
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1
Introduction
After extensively focusing on the effects of migration on destination-countries, scholars
of migration study began in the past few decades to explore the effects of migration on migrantsending countries. According to the World Bank, annual remittance flows to low- and middleincome countries reached USD 529 billion in 2018, which is an increase of 9.6 percent over the
earlier record high of USD 483 billion in 2017. In 2019, the remittance share of GDP reached as
high as 37.6 % in Tonga followed by 37.6% in Haiti, 34.1 % in South Sudan, 29.2 % in Kyrgyz
Republic, and 28.2% in Tajikistan. Figure 1.1 illustrates the global increase in remittances:
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Figure 1.1: Global Remittances

This is a pattern that has been growing across the developing world. Thus, scholars have
more and more grown interest in studying the effects of the expanding remittances on the
migrant-sending countries. A few examples of the dependent variables that have been studied are
human rights, degree of democracy, neo-liberalism, and civil conflicts. But there is a scarcity of

studies done on the effects of remittances on ethnicity. To this end, we study whether remittances
increases or decreases ethnic tension, and what potential channels contribute to the impact.
At this point, we want to draw attention to the fact that whereas all of the literature
referred to in this paper deal with ethnic conflict, our research focuses on ethnic tension. This
variable will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, but to put it simply, ethnic tension
happens at sub-conflictual level and ideally encapsulates all kinds of aggressive acts and feelings
between individuals of ethnic groups. We want to emphasize that much of the literature and logic
concerning ethnic conflict applies to ethnic tension as well. In cases where we think that the
arguments surrounding ethnic tension can be distinguished from those concerning ethnic conflict,
we will mention so.
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Figure 1.2: Mean Ethnic Tension

Figure 1.2 demonstrates that global ethnic tension has remained nearly constant for
nearly two decades and has increased compared to the end of the Cold War. Looking at figures
1.1 and 1.2, we can ask if remittances and ethnic tension are related. If so, in what way are they
related? And what are the channels through which the interaction takes place? At a first glance, it
may seem like remittances decreases ethnic tension through the means of decreased grievances
among discriminated ethnicities and increased overall opportunities for people of migrant-

sending countries and through transfer of liberal, non-violent norms including the notion of
wider global identity as opposed to a narrow ethnic-based identity. However, several papers that
study similar topics suggest a different possibility. For example, Bang (2019) argue that
remittances increases human rights violations [6]. Hence, the question of how remittances can
affect ethnic tension prevalent in many nations does not necessarily have a positive, optimistic
response. Neither is the response a simple yes or no answer.

As mentioned earlier, there is a dearth of literature on the effects of remittances on
ethnicity in general and ethnic tension in particular. This paper shall contribute to fill this gap.
Not only does this paper have implication on understanding how to handle the remittance
situation for addressing problems of ethnic tension and potential conflicts, but it shall cast better
light on exploring what ethnic tension itself is, and by extension, what ethnicity is, and what
prevents a global identity that seemingly has increased in the globalized world of today from
either supplanting or at least positively affecting ethnic identities.

The following section will explain the theoretical indeterminacy of the impact of
remittances on ethnic tension within migrant-sending countries. We critically review arguments
from the limited existing literature on this topic to illustrate the need for directly working with
the data. Chapter 3 shall introduce the primary independent variable and control variables. Then,
Chapter 4 shall illustrate the results of regressions of the various models. Finally, Chapter 5 shall
end with concluding remarks and overall assessment of the contents of the research as well as the
implications for further study.

2
Channels of effect of remittances
To look at the effect of remittances on ethnic tension, we analyze several inter-related
channels that are affected by remittances and that in turn have been considered to have impact on
ethnic tension. The channels that we consider in this section are: inequality, corruption, and
government involvement in the economy.

2.1 Channel of remittances-inequality-ethnic tension
First, we discuss the relationship between ethnic tension and inequality. Two kinds of
inequality are discussed in the literature- general level of inequality and group-level inequality.
Of these, the general level of inequality refers to inter-individual inequality. Upon basic analysis,
it may seem that the inter-individual inequality, which is conventionally measured by indicators
such as Gini coefficient, leads to conflict because it indicates grievances among individuals. But
various theories along with the empirical studies connected with the respective theories stand
against this point of view. For example, Collier (2004) find in their empirical studies that there is
no significant effect of inequality on civil conflicts [27]. They theorize that instead, factors such
as scope for extortion of natural resources, access to finance, etc. that collectively comprise
"greed" motivates civil conflicts. Similar rejection of the importance of inter-individual
inequality on conflict is echoed in the works of Fearon (2003) [28]. However, the authors who
make arguments along this line fail to distinguish between inter-individual inequality and grouplevel inequality. For proponents who emphasize the relevance of group-level inequality, the
"grievances" model still holds. For example, Barrow (1976) and Horowitz (1985) theorize
various measures of ethnic inequality that in turn impact conflict [15]. Likewise, the political
scientist Gurr argues in his works that inter-group inequality collectively faced by minorities are
important factors for ethnic conflicts [15]. Thus, the rejection of general level of inequality as a
significant variable is not entirely relevant to the theory and studies presented by these latter
groups.
Besides the above two contesting schools of thoughts regarding relationship between
inequality and conflict, others have developed more nuanced concept called horizontal inequality

[15]. Similar to the likes of Gurr, proponents of horizontal inequality also theorize the
importance and relevance of inter-group inequality on conflict. Ostby (2013) argues that violent
conflict is a group phenomenon rather than a situation of individuals committing acts of violence
against each other [15]. In addition, horizontal inequality does not exclusively focus only on
economic inequality; it also considers political and social dimensions of inequality. Thus, the
extent of systematic inequality determines collective grievances that in turn provide motivation
for ethnic conflict. Another distinguishing feature of the literature of horizontal inequality is that
it also considers grievances on the part of the privilege. Ostby (2013) argues that the relatively
privileged in a horizontally unequal society can also engage in violence against the unprivileged
"as a reaction to what they may perceive of as unfair distribution, or out of fear that the relatively
deprived may demand more resources and political power (e.g. the Biafra war in Nigeria, or the
Basque conflict in Spain)" [15]. A pioneer of the notion of horizontal inequality, Stewart (2002,
2008) has shown that horizontal inequalities have caused ethnic violence in several countries
such as Uganda and Sri Lanka [29, 30]. Although several political scientists have shown
primarily via case studies such as those conducted by Stewart that horizontal inequality is
significantly related to conflict across groups (including ethnic groups), there is no standard
measure of horizontal inequality that can be statistically replicated. Thus, the literature still faces
a lack of clarity and consensus on the relationship between inequality and conflict. Nonetheless,
we will heavily draw upon this literature in our theoretical discussion, especially concerning the
channel of remittances-inequality-ethnic tension.
At this point, it is important to note that the literature on horizontal inequality provides
schematic explanation only for conflict across groups marked by ethnicity, caste, religion, etc. It
is possible that given the prevalence of various kinds of philosophies and beliefs that appeal to
class-based identity and that have led to the formation of class-based identities, the principles of
horizontal inequality can be applicable to such class-based groups. But given the lack of
literature and the scope of this project, we limit our discussion only to ethnic groups.
The preceding paragraphs discuss various possibilities of the effect of varying notions of
inequality upon ethnic tension. To complete our discussion of the channel remittancesinequality-ethnic tension, we still have to analyze the possible effect of remittances on
inequality. Bang (2016) theorize that there are three scenarios concerning the effect of

remittances on income inequality [14]. First is that poor people have access to and choose to
migrate and earn remittance income. But they and their family in migrant-sending countries
spend remittances primarily on consumption expenditures. This leads to an increase in income
inequality. The second scenario is again where poor people have access to and choose to migrate
and earn remittance income. But unlike the first scenario, their family in the home country
spends significant portion of the remittance earnings on investment. This leads to a decrease in
income inequality. In the final scenario, only richer households engage in the remittance
economy. This will increase income inequality. Although the effect of general level of income
inequality on ethnic conflict is rejected by most empirical studies as discussed earlier, it is
relevant for our discussion if the distribution of income systematically varies across ethnic
groups. We shall apply this insight as one of our tools in the discussions that follow.
To illustrate the complexity of the channel remittances-inequality-ethnic tension, we
present a simple hypothetical example. We assume a remittance-dependent economy with only
two ethnic groups-Nepalese and Bangladeshis. First, let us assume that the two ethnic groups are
homogenous i.e. there is no economic inequality1 within each of the ethnic groups. In this case,
there are two sub-scenarios. The sub-scenarios are: i) there is no significant horizontal inequality
between Nepalese and Bangladeshis, ii) there is significant horizontal inequality between
Nepalese and Bangladeshis. In the first case, ignoring the inherent disadvantages of a country
such as poverty or terrible weather which provide equal incentives for individuals in both groups
to migrate, it is likely that since no group faces systematic inequality, they will not have
incentive to leave their home country. Any variation in distribution of migration and remittance
income between the groups would depend on additional indeterminate factors such as culture.
Such a variation can have indeterminate impact upon ethnic rivalry and conflict. In the second
scenario, the relatively privileged group naturally has more access to migration and remittance
opportunities. But the relatively disadvantaged group is likely to have more incentive to
migration and remittance opportunities. One sub-possibility SP-12 is that the relatively privileged
migrate more and therefore, earn more remittances. Thus, the between-group inequality
1

There may exist other dimensions of inequality within each group. But for the sake of simplicity, we consider only
the economic dimension here.
2
For the sake of clarity, I have used the term "SP-n" which is an abbreviation for sub-possibility marked by the
corresponding reference number. I use similar terminology in other parts of the text for clarification. The context
should help keep track of the reference number.

increases. From our discussion of the horizontal inequality literature, we deduce that this
encourages further grievances among the disadvantaged group. It also lowers opportunity cost
for the disadvantaged group to engage in ethnic conflict. Thus, it increases ethnic tension.
Another sub-possibility SP-2 is that the relatively disadvantaged make use of whatever little
opportunity for migration and successfully end up decreasing relative inequality. Again, as
explained earlier, the relatively privileged may have fears that the relatively unprivileged may
demand more resources and political power. This can increase ethnic tension.
When we relax our assumption that there is no economic homogeneity within the groups
and instead realistically consider that there exists within-group economic inequality, the scenario
becomes more complicated. Lack of economic homogeneity means that there is a degree of
richness among people within each group. For simplicity again, we divide each population into
rich and poor. Thus, there are elite Bangladeshis and poor Bangladeshis. By the same token,
there are elite Nepalese and poor Nepalese. Upon the application of remittances to such a
society, the first sub-possibility SP-i3 is that poor Bangladeshis and Nepalese have access to
remittances and migration. In this case, regardless of whether or not there exists significant
horizontal inequality across the two groups, the level of within group inequality is affected by
how much the poor Bangladeshis and Nepalese spend on consumption and investment. From our
discussion of relationship between remittances and income-inequality as explained by Bang
(2016), we observe that spending on consumption only increases within-group inequality for the
concerned group. Spending significantly on investment decreases within-group inequality. The
aggregate level of grievances are heightened when both poor Nepalese and Bangladeshis
experience increased within-group inequality. Another sub-possibility SP-ii is that only the rich
Nepalese or Bangladeshis have access to migration and remittances. This increases within-group
inequality for both ethnicities.
To make our case simpler, we focus on the worst scenario from SP-i and the general
result of SP-ii. Both SP-i and SP-ii indicate aggravation of within-group inequality. Since, as
explained in the discussion of literature on horizontal inequality, we are concerned with ethnic
tension rather than class tension, our focus is on how these scenarios directly and indirectly lead

to ethnic conflict. Thus, we do not concern ourselves with the very real possibility of the poor
people within each ethnic group coming together to see themselves as a systematically
discriminated class-based group. In both SP-i and SP-ii, the theory of diversionary warfare is
applicable. The elites in each group use diversionary strategies to hold members of another
ethnic group as responsible for the increased inequality experienced by the affected people.
Thus, Nepalese elites would communicate to the poor Nepalese that it is Bangladeshis who are
responsible for their poverty. Likewise, Bangladeshi elites would communicate to the poor
Bangladeshis that it is Nepalese who are responsible for their poverty. Tir (2008) argues that
when facing domestic problems, leaders can elicit public support and approval by blaming ethnic
minorities and even engaging in armed conflict against ethnic minorities particularly [17].
Therefore, both sub-possibilities increase ethnic tension.

2.2 Channel of remittances-pattern of government expenditure-ethnic tension
Another primary channel relevant to our topic is the pattern of expenditure of a state.
Whether or not government involvement via wealth transfers and welfare spending is beneficial
or harmful in terms of ethnic tension is a debated topic. From the perspective of the school of
thought in which government intervention is considered beneficial, welfare spending and wealth
transfers are important for reducing ethnic tension. Likewise, Chua (2003) argues that free
markets cause violent ethnic conflicts because free markets concentrate substantial wealth in the
hands of ethnic minorities, generate jealousy and hatred, and thereby, encourage violent actions
against privileged groups [31]. On the other hand, proponents of laissez fear argue that
government intervention adversely affects ethnic violence. Steinberg (2008) argue based on
rigorous econometric analysis that "free market economies reduce violent ethnic conflict by
reducing fear and insecurity" [11]. They claim that by making various ethnic groups feel
vulnerable and insecure, government involvement in the economy can provide incentives to the
groups to resort to violence. In this paradigm, laissez faire decreases inter-ethnic fear by deemphasizing and reducing the significance of running the state. There are other notions within
the literature of ethnic tension which can support the laissez fear proposition. Whereas most
researches that look at ethnic tension ignore the role of state by either assuming the absence of
the state as the very core reason behind conflict or by considering state as ethnically neutral,

Cederman (2009) argue that ethnic conflicts are a result of "competing ethnonationalist claims to
state power" [2]. They argue that variations in ethnic constellations concerning state power lead
to various scenarios of ethnic conflict. This implies that conflict depends on the intervention of
states or governments both in the politics and the economy. This ties in with the argument of
laissez faire proponents that reducing the importance of running the state reduces ethnic tension.
Whereas there are a number of papers that discuss the effect of government intervention
on ethnic tension, there is scarce literature concerning effect of remittances on government
spending. Doyle (2015) argues that governments of countries that receive substantial remittances
reduce government expenditure on social spending [18]. Since remittances develop the ability of
citizens to take care of their needs, governments feel less pressure and obligation to provide for
their citizens via social transfer and spending. Additionally, those who receive remittances
regularly have expectations of higher future income and consequently, they have expectations of
upward social mobility. This will cause them to not support governments that advocate
redistribution and higher taxes. Hence, governments that receive remittances have less incentive
to engage in social spending. Doyle (2015) writes, "Therefore, all else being equal, the greater
the volume of remittances that flow into a country, the larger the coalition with reduced support
for social security transfers and government taxation, which in time, will translate into reduced
social security and welfare expenditure" [18]. As discussed earlier, some argue that reduction in
welfare expenditures and social security translates into ethnic tension. On the contrary, the
laissez-faire proponents argue that government involvement especially in the form of social
security and welfare expenditure increases ethnic tension. Therefore, we can conclude that the
effect of remittances on ethnic tension via the channel of government spending is indeterminate.

2.3 Channel of remittances-corruption-ethnic tension
Another impact of remittances is on corruption. There are several key points in the
literature regarding this topic. Ahmed (2012) has argued that remittances allow governments to
reduce provision of subsidy as well as welfare expenditures and instead increase patronage and
transfer to private goods [32]. This argument falls along the line of substitution effect; similar to
natural resources, remittances is supposed to increase corruption by creating incentives for rentseeking behaviors and bribery. In this case, because of increase in corruption, the benefits that
poor people would receive otherwise is reduced. Neudorfer (2014) propose that corruption

creates distortions in the process of political decision-making which increase economic and
political inequalities between various ethnic groups [7]. If an ethnic group has to
disproportionately bear the burden of the resultant inequality, we can argue based on the
literature of horizontal inequality that this leads to increased grievances. Hence, we could
theorize that remittances can increase ethnic tension.
The substitution effect, however, is not the only possible mechanism. Tyburski (2012)
argues that migrants and their beneficiaries have the incentive to use remittances as a political
tool to reduce corruption [9]. Adida (2010) argue that remittances encourages migrants to
participate politically for enforcing liberal government norms that include decreased corruption
[9]. Likewise, from this accountability perspective, remittances are not analogous to natural
resources, which enable substitution effects. Remittances directly accrue to citizens, who can
pressure political groups to reduce corruption and provide better public goods. Additionally,
there are arguments, which reconcile the differences between the accountability and the
substitution effects. Tyburski (2014) argues that the differences in the political institutions of a
country affect the nature of corruption control and the distribution of benefits of remittances. In
autocratic regimes, governments are more likely to use remittances to increase political
patronage. Likewise, migrants face greater costs of influencing government decision. On the
other hand, in democratic regimes, migrants have greater ability to influence political decisions.
This makes the government respond to migrants' expectations and political pressure. Tyburski
illustrates that remittances have mitigating effects on corruption because of this. From this
perspective then, reduction in corruption positively addresses grievances of poor people. If the
resultant alleviation of poverty benefits a relatively disadvantaged ethnic group, it reduces their
grievances. This reduces ethnic tension. We can see that even though the effect of corruption on
ethnic tension seems uni-directional, it is not entirely clear.

2.4 Conclusion
To bring together our understanding of the various channels discussed in the earlier
section, we present the following figure:

Figure 2.1: Schematic Diagram of Channels

The variables that interact have been shown with arrows. As we can see, we have
explained how remittances affect inequality, corruption, and government expenditure; we have
also explained how inequality, corruption and government expenditure affect ethnic tension. We
acknowledge that several other channels have been discussed in the literature that we have not
covered for the sake of simplicity. Likewise, there may be other channels missing. Nonetheless,
the discussion so far has shown a lack of clear theory and empirical difficulty to understand the
relationships we are trying to explore. It is characterized by heavy indeterminacy.
To conclude our theoretical discussion, we want to very briefly theoretically discuss the
nature of interaction between our primary channels as well. Scandinavian countries with high
levels of welfare spending are known for low levels of inequality.4 However, it is also not
difficult to imagine a government engaging in welfare spending directed towards exclusive
ethnicities. Likewise, government expenditure and corruption can be hypothesized to have
negative relationships. Some of the researches in the literature on remittances and welfare
spending and corruption state that when governments receive remittances, they direct their
expenditure away from welfare spending towards corruption (e.g., Doyle, 2015). It can mean that
government expenditure and corruption have negative relationship i.e. increase in welfare
4

Although the inequality talked about in this context is income inequality, given the
homogeneity of ethnicity in these countries, it is difficult to assess between-group inequality in
these countries. Given that the welfare spending in these countries apply equally to all citizens,
one can expect low level of horizontal inequality as well.

spending indicates decrease in corruption. However, this implies only a correlation, not a
causation. Additionally, it is possible for a corrupt government to officially record welfare
spending only in its books while diverting those funds towards private transfers. In terms of
relationship between inequality and corruption, one could argue that corruption is positively
related to inequality since corruption implies a country with poor institution where the
governments systematically benefit from ethnic conflicts and suppression of minorities.

3
Data
The table below shows the list of covariates. The variables that we use are ethnic tension,
remittances, corruption, Gross Domestic Product (GDP), growth rate of GDP, FDI Net inflows, Electoral
Democracy Index, Liberal Democracy Index, and eight ethnic power variables.

Variable
ethnic_tension
remittances

Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Observations Mean
Sd
Min
3536
4.0001
1.31
0
3311
3.03
4.86
.0000289

corruption
gdp_ppp

3536
3569

2.90
15146.83

1.30
17313.37

0
285.5861

6

growth_gdp

3571

3.56

4.93

-64.04711

54.157

fdi_inflows

3543

4.559

16.28

-58.32

449.08

v2x_polyarchy
v2x_libdem
egippop
legippop
exclpop
lexclpop
discrimpop
ldiscrimpop
maxexclpop
lmaxexclpop

3747
3747
3371
3371
3371
3371
3371
3371
3371
3371

.567
.4538
.63
.69
.128
.141
.026
.030
.090
.099

.2595
.2707
.35
.36
.17
.19
.086
.094
.128
.140

.013
.012
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

.919
.892
1
1
.915
.919
.796
.811
.77
.77

Max
6
38.52

141635

Source
ICRG
World
Bank
ICRG
World
Bank
World
Bank
World
Bank
VDem
VDem
EPR
EPR
EPR
EPR
EPR
EPR
EPR
EPR

Next we justify the usage of the independent variables, but we do not hypothesize the direction
of the coefficient. Before the actual econometric analysis, we did not expect or hypothesize a particular
coefficient because as illustrated in the introductory section, it is difficult to predict a specific directional
outcome for our study. Thus, we wanted to follow the actual steps in writing down this section. Later
the discussion of our results of the primary independent variable shall show how a uni-directional
coefficient can be misleading.

We proceed by discussing the primary dependent variable. Our primary dependent variable is
Ethnic Tension, which is a part of the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). It was prepared to assess
potential risks to international businesses. The ICRG is an aggregate measure of risks of political,
financial and economic nature. Of these various sub-components, ethnic tension is a sub-index of the
Political Risk Rating. The ICRG manual describes it as "an assessment of the degree of tension within a
country attributable to racial, nationality, or language divisions" [33]. It is measured on a 6-point scale.
Lower score implies higher racial and nationality tensions, whereas higher rating indicates vice-versa. It
is different from actual conflict as the Political Risk Rating includes "Internal Conflict" and "External
Conflict", which measure concrete conflicts and are different from ethnic tension [33]. Thus, ethnic
tension represents violence at sub-conflictual level. Although this dataset is available from 1984
onwards, we use data only after 1991 to avoid complexity involved in assessing pre-Cold War data. This
applies to all the variables we have used for our work. Another point to be noted is that the components
involved in the calculation of this index is not publicly available.
Our primary independent variable is remittances as percentage of Gross Domestic Product
(GDP). This is borrowed from the World Bank. It is a standard and the most comprehensive panel
measure of remittances. The World Bank is heavily involved in financial matters of developing countries.
Thus, they keep the most rigorous record of variables such as remittances, which forms a significant
income source to developing countries. The Introduction section explains the multi-facetedness of the
channels via which remittances can affect ethnic tension. It also illustrates the difficulty in theoretically
positing a uni-directional impact. It was claimed that it is precisely for this reason that we need to
conduct a statistical analysis.
We also consider the impact that corruption has on ethnic tension. Corruption is an important
variable for our research because corruption affects the distribution of resources. This can serve one
ethnic group while reducing the benefits to another. The ways in which it can affect ethnic tension is

explained extensively in the Introduction section. We refrain from hypothesizing the expected effect of
corruption. Our variable is drawn from the ICRG dataset. It forms a part of the Political Risk component
in that dataset and is measured on a 6-point scale with lower point indicating higher level of corruption
and higher representing lower level of corruption. It primarily includes actual and potential corruption in
the form of "excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, 'favor-for-favors', secret party funding,
and suspiciously close ties between politics and business" [33]. It does not focus much on financial
corruption in the form of bribes connected with "import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax
assessments, police protection, or loans" [33]. Of various papers in the literature that use corruption in
the study of conflicts, Neudorfer (2014) particularly use the ICRG dataset as well.
A country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is also likely to impact the ethnic tension. We borrow
the data from the World Bank. GDP is converted into a common currency for comparison purposes
either nominally or via Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). We follow the latter because it takes into account
the cost of living of a particular country. This arguably makes the assessment more comparable. Among
many papers that include GDP as a control variable in the assessment of ethnic tension, Regan (2014)
particularly also uses this variable [19].
We also assess the impact of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows. These are again borrowed
from the World Bank and these are all measured as a percentage of GDP. Mathews (2010) and Kishi
(2017) explore the potential impact that FDI has on conflicts [22, 23]. From this we can make a case that
FDI causally affects ethnic tension. FDI inflows, like remittances, are also a part of the income of the
country. Thus, it is well understood in the literature that FDI can have effect on economic and political
indicators of a country.
The growth rate of GDP, which is also borrowed from the World Bank, is also considered.
Bohlken (2010) finds that an increase in economic growth rate reduced expected number of HinduMuslim riots in India [25]. Thus, we use this as an evidence to gather that growth rate can affect ethnic

tension. Another example of usage of this in the literature is by Miguel (2004) [34]. Much like other
positive economic interventions, an increased growth rate could either reduce ethnic tension by
addressing the general level of grievances of a country or increase ethnic tension by encouraging
competition to access to distribution of benefits indicated the economic growth.
We also control for the level of democracy in a country. Mousseau (2001) finds that democracy
is related to political violence in a curvilinear inverted U-shape form [26]. Specifically, the inverted Ucurve for democracy vis-à-vis political violence is assymetric for ethnically heterogeneous countries.
Hence we observe that democracy is causally related to ethnic conflicts. Among many papers that study
ethnic conflict, Fearon (2003) and Sambanis (2001) also use democracy as a control variable [4, 28]. This
is a common practice in the literature. Of various indices of democracy, Polity Index is a widely
employed method. It is used by Sambanis (2001) as well. But Vreeland (2008) argues that since certain
components of the Polity Index "are defined with explicit reference civil war", it is not appropriate to use
the overall Polity Index in statistical analyses of civil war [1]. We extend this logic to the study of ethnic
tension as well and avoid using Polity Index. Instead, the data we use for our models is drawn from VDem dataset. It provides a multidimensional and disaggregated dataset that reflects the complexity of
the concept of democracy as a system of rule that does not merely consider the presence of elections
[35].It categories democracy into five major kinds: electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative, and
egalitarian, and collects data so as to measure these principles. Of these, we choose the variables called
v2x_polyarchy and v2x_libdem, which are Electoral democracy index and Liberal democracy index
respectively. Both indices range from 0 to 1 with 0 being the lowest level of the concerned democracy
and 1 being the highest. One reason for choosing these two of the five kinds was that we wanted to
focus our study and not scatter our attention on various possibilities of one control variable. The other
theoretical reason for which we do not have a literature to support our choice is that of the five indices,

these two represent societies where ethnic tension could be most charged either positively or
negatively because they allow most expression of discontent.
Another group of control variables that we include in our models is from the EPR (Ethnic Power
Relations) dataset. Our rationale for including this kind of variable is that the state of ethnicity in a
country is fundamental to ethnic conflict. It is precisely for this reason that many papers in the literature
on ethnic and civil conflicts include variables such as ethnic fractionalization and polarization. For
example, Fearon (2003) and Sambanis (2001) employ measures of ethnic fractionalization [4, 28]. But
we chose the EPR dataset that includes indices that measure various forms of ethnopolitical
configurations of power. Cederman (2009) argue that "highly diverse societies are not more conflict
prone" [2]. Rather, ethnic politics is considered in this specific literature to be powerful and robust
predictor of civil war. Cederman (2010) also point out that the EPR dataset is better than another
popular ethnic dataset used in the study of conflict named Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset because the
MAR dataset restricts its data sample to mobilized minorities and thus misses a big picture of the reality
concerning ethnic tension [3]. It is for these reasons that we borrow variables from the EPR dataset.
Cederman (2009) point out that armed rebellions are possible in states where large portion of
population is excluded on the basis of ethnic background [2]. Likewise, when a significantly large
number of competing elites share power in a segmented state, the possibility of violent infighting is
amplified. Then secessionist conflicts are probable in "incohesive states with a short history of direct
rule" [2]. The variables that we use from this dataset along with their definition are as follows:
egippop: sum of the population of all Ethnic Groups In Power (EGIP) groups in a country
expressed as a fraction of total population.
legippop: EGIP population as a fraction of ethnically relevant population in a country.
exclpop: sum of the population of all MEG (Marginalized Ethnic Groups) groups in a country,
expressed as a fraction of total population.

lexclpop: MEG population as a fraction of ethnically relevant population in a country.
discrimpop: sum of discriminated population in a country expressed as a fraction of total
population.
ldiscrimpop: sum of discriminated population expressed as a fraction of ethnically relevant
population in a country.
maxexclpop: size of the largest MEG group in a country, expressed as a fraction of total
population.
lmaxexclpop: size of the largest MEG group in a country as a fraction of ethnically relevant
population.
All of the above variables range from 0 to 1 with 1 being the highest and 0 being the lowest of
the concerned indication [37].

4
Methods
4.1 Time Series Cross Section Data
We conduct our study on an unbalanced panel data (called Time-Series-Cross-Section data in
Statistics) set of 125 countries from the years of 1991 to 2019. A time-series-cross-section data reflects
relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variables across representative
members across a specified time. Thus, it has two aspects: individual and time. In our case, the
representative members are the 125 countries and the time span of the data is 29 years. This nature of
the data helps us observe relationship between ethnic tension and primarily remittances across the
representative countries over time. The reason this dataset is called "unbalanced" is because data for
some years of some countries are missing. We did not attempt to interpolate the data as that would
introduce bias.

4.2 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
We begin our analysis with the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model. In this model and for the
rest of the models, our primary dependent variable is always the Ethnic Tension which we call yit, which
is the ethnic tension for the ith country at time t. The matrix of all the covariates is represented by Xkit.
Here t is the year, i is the country and k is the control variable. The covariates are described in Chapter 3.
The results of the primary OLS is shown in Table 4.1.
The model (1) in Table 4.1 shows that remittances has a significant impact on ethnic tension at
.001 alpha-level. We then conduct another variation of OLS to evaluate whether remittances retains its
significance. For this, we want to replace a variable that is not significant in the model (1) with an
alternate variable. In the model (1), three variables- growth rate of GDP, FDI inflows, and Electoral
Democracy Index are not significant. But it is only the electoral democracy index that has an alternative
available. Thus, we replace the v2x_polyarchy (Electoral Democracy Index) with the v2x_libdem i.e. the

Liberal Democracy Index. We again see that remittances is significant with a positive coefficient at .001
alpha level.

Remittances as share
of GDP(% of GDP)

Table 4.1: OLS
(1)
(2)
Ethnic Tension Ethnic Tension
0.0392***
0.0401***

(3)
Ethnic Tension
0.0526***

(4)
Ethnic Tension
0.0455***

(0.00452)

(0.00452)

(0.00469)

(0.00459)

Corruption

0.232***
(0.0205)

0.217***
(0.0211)

0.241***
(0.0218)

0.226***
(0.0214)

Growth Rate of GDP

-0.00256
(0.00535)

-0.00157
(0.00534)

0.00106
(0.00552)

-0.00244
(0.00544)

0.0000104***

0.00000954***

0.0000132***

0.00000997***

(0.00000163)

(0.00000167)

(0.00000172)

(0.00000170)

-0.00142

-0.00147

-0.00191

-0.00136

(0.00120)

(0.00120)

(0.00124)

(0.00122)

-2.081***
(0.118)

-2.043***
(0.118)

0.280**

0.471***

0.423***

(0.107)

(0.110)

(0.108)

GDP converted by
Purchasing Power
Parity

FDI Net Inflows(%
of GDP)

Lexclpop

Electoral democracy
index

0.112
(0.105)

Liberal democracy
index

-2.710***
(0.294)

Discrimpop

-2.158***
(0.159)

Lmaxexclpop
3.288***
(0.0803)
3003

Constant
Observations
Standard errors in parentheses

*

3.270***
(0.0729)
3003

p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

2.795***
(0.0683)
3003

3.087***
(0.0721)
3003

To test the consistency of significance of remittances, we want to conduct another OLS. There
are several ethnic power variables that can act as substitute for each other. Thus, in model (3) in Table
4.1, we randomly replace lexclpop (marginalized ethnic group population as a fraction of ethnically
relevant population in a country) with discrimpop (sum of discriminated population in a country
expressed as a fraction of total population.). In model (4) in Table 4.1 we use lmaxeclpop (size of the
largest marginalized ethnic group in a country as a fraction of ethnically relevant population). We see
similar results. All of this indicates that there is a good foundation for investigating the relationship
between remittances and ethnic tension.
We have explained in the Introduction section that ethnic exclusion is directly related to ethnic
conflict as it encourages grievances. Thus, we want to choose variables out of the EPR variables that best
capture ethnic exclusion. Of the eight EPR variables, egipop and legippop deal with ethnic groups in
power. So they are not related to ethnic exclusion. The exclpop, discrimpop, and maxexclpop are
concerned with variations in the share of excluded population out of the total population. Since the
entire population is not ethnically relevant, their share of the ethnically relevant population better
capture ethnic exclusion. Out of the remaining three, discrimpop refers to the share of discriminated
population, which is less powerful than that of marginalized population. Out of the remaining two, the
lexclpop means marginalized ethnic group population as a fraction of ethnically relevant population in a
country. It, therefore, specifically captures the marginalized ethnic population as a proportion of the
population of those ethnic groups that are ethnically relevant. Thus it best captures ethnic exclusion and
we use it as the primary default ethnic power variable. Likewise, lmaxeclpop means the size of the
largest marginalized ethnic groups in a country as a fraction of ethnically relevant population. In other
words, out of the marginalized ethnic groups, it indicates the share of the largest one. Thus, it captures
ethnic exclusion the most after lexclpop. Hence we use this as the second default variable. These
choices additionally ensure simplicity and consistency in applying and interpreting the regressions.

Another important result that we consistently see across the several OLS models is the lack of
significance of the growth rate of GDP. This could happen for two reasons. The first is that there are
hidden dependencies between this variable with the rest of the variables. The second is that the use of
this variable possibly leads to an overly determined system. In other words, it is extraneous.

Table 4.2: OLS without growth rate of GDP
(1)
(2)
(3)
Ethnic Tension
Ethnic Tension
Ethnic Tension
Remittances as share of
0.0393***
0.0401***
0.0446***
GDP(% of GDP)
(0.00452)
(0.00452)
(0.00459)
Corruption

GDP converted by
Purchasing Power Parity

FDI Net Inflows(% of
GDP)

Lexclpop

Electoral democracy
index

0.217***
(0.0211)

0.244***
(0.0209)

0.226***
(0.0214)

0.0000105***

0.00000958***

0.0000111***

0.0000100***

(0.00000162)

(0.00000166)

(0.00000165)

(0.00000169)

-0.00145

-0.00148

-0.00138

-0.00138

(0.00120)

(0.00120)

(0.00122)

(0.00122)

-2.079***
(0.118)

-2.042***
(0.118)

0.118

0.270*

(0.104)

(0.105)
0.284**
(0.106)

Lmaxexclpop

Observations
Standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

(0.00459)

0.232***
(0.0205)

Liberal democracy index

Constant

(4)
Ethnic Tension
0.0455***

3.273***
(0.0739)
3003

3.262***
(0.0669)
3003

0.429***
(0.107)
-2.192***
(0.159)

-2.154***
(0.159)

3.056***
(0.0723)
3003

3.074***
(0.0656)
3003

Theoretically, we cannot provide a precise reason as to why of all the variables, growth rate of
GDP specifically could be marked by these issues. However, since the OLS results indicate so, we
conduct a few OLS by removing it. Table 4.2 shows the results of the models done without the growth
rate of GDP. We can see that in the first model in Table 4.2, aside from the Electoral Democracy Index
and FDI inflows, all the independent variables are statistically significant. We raise question regarding
usage of democracy indices, but replacing the model with the Liberal Democracy Index, we see that
these indices are significant. Thus, we do not remove the democracy variables. Additionally, as opposed
to growth rate of GDP, which has relationship with other economic variables that we keep in the model,
there is no other democracy variable aside from the V-dem variables we use. Thus, we keep the V-dem
variables since we have seen theoretically that democracy impacts ethnic tension. Likewise, we see that
FDI inflows is consistently not significant across models. But theoretically, FDI inflows is an income
similar to remittances. Thus, it is a theoretically important variable and we choose to keep it to see if it
shows significant impacts in more advanced regression models. We can see that the rest of the variables
are mostly significant at 0.001 alpha-level. But other methods can perform better than OLS since it does
not account for the time dimension of the time-series data.
A time-series-cross-section data includes entries for the variables for countries across time. It
means that there exist some fixed characteristics of a country such as language, institutions, culture,
history, religion, etc. that impact its response to changes in the independent variables. Whereas one
country may respond positively to remittances for institutional reasons, another may respond
negatively. These fixed characteristics change only slowly over time and for the purposes of our study
that covers only 28 years, they are arguably invariant and inherent. These invariant characteristics,
which are generally referred to as "fixed effects" in econometric analyses, are parts of the error term.
Therefore, similar to the time-series-cross-section data, the error term (𝜖𝑖𝑡 ) also constitutes both timevariant as well as time-invariant components. Mathematically, it can be represented as:

𝜖𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 ,

where 𝑐𝑖 is time invariant aspect.

Now we look at the Gauss-Markov assumptions of OLS to analyze which of them are not
satisfied in the regressions conducted earlier in this section:
1) The error term 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is a random real number.
2) The explanatory variables are non-stochastic. That is, the values taken by the regressors are
considered to be fixed in repeated sampling.
3) The variance of the error term is constant. This means that for a given value of 𝑋, the variance
of the error term is the same for all observations. Mathematically, it is represented by:
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝜖𝑖𝑡 |𝑋𝑖𝑡 ) = 𝜎 2
4) The conditional mean of the error term is 0. It means that for each value of 𝑋, the error terms
takes various values. Mathematically, it means:
𝐸(𝜖𝑖𝑡 |𝑋𝑖𝑡 ) = 0
5) The random term of different observations are independent. That is, there is no autocorrelation
within the error term. Mathematically,
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝜖𝑖𝑡 , 𝜖𝑗𝑡 |𝑋𝑖𝑡 , 𝑋𝑗𝑡 ) = 0
6) The error term and the explanatory variables have zero covariance between them.
Mathematically,
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝜖𝑖𝑡 , 𝑋𝑖𝑡 ) = 0
𝐸(𝜖𝑖𝑡 𝑋𝑖𝑡 ) = 0
7) There should be variability in the explanatory variable. Statistically, for each regressor 𝑋, the
𝑣𝑎𝑟 (𝑋𝑖𝑡 ) is a finite positive number.
8) The number of observations 𝑛 must be greater than the number of parameters to be estimated.

9) There is no specification error in the model used in the empirical analysis.
10) There is no perfect or near to perfect multicollinearity between the independent variables.
There are several assumptions of the OLS that are violated. First, because our data has both a
country and a time dimension, there are variables not included in the model that systematically affect
the dependent variable 𝑦𝑖𝑡 i.e. ethnic tension. This leads to omitted variable bias. Thus, the assumption
(4) is violated i.e. 𝐸(𝜖𝑖𝑡 |𝑋𝑖𝑡 ) ≠ 0.
Secondly, the assumption (6) is also violated because the time invariant part of the error time
i.e. 𝑐𝑖𝑡 is inherently correlated with the independent variables. This causes the error term (𝜖𝑖𝑡 ) to be
correlated with the independent variables. Mathematically, this is represented by:
𝐸(𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑐𝑖 ) ≠ 0
𝐸(𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝜖𝑖𝑡 ) ≠ 0
Given the violation of these basic assumptions, we conclude that OLS is not the correct model
for our analysis.

4.3 Rejection of Random Effect Panel
In the literature, one model that is generally used in consideration of time-series-cross-section
data is the Random Effect Panel with Standard Errors Clustered by Country. However, ethnic tension,
which is the dependent variable in our model, is largely time-invariant. Likewise, the index used to
capture ethnic tension itself has a very small range from 0 to 6. This is unlike our primary independent
variable, remittances, which can change by a few thousand dollars every year. This is illustrated by the
fact that the maximum standard deviation for ethnic tension in our sample is 1.8, whereas the maximum
standard deviation for remittances is 9.04. In such a case, the FE model is unable to accurately capture
the relationship between the regressors and ethnic tension. Instead, the standard method used in the

literature is systems GMM (Generalized Method of Moments). But it is beyond the scope of an
undergraduate project. Thus we look for another method of estimating the parameters.

4.4 OLS with panel-corrected Standard Errors
4.4.1 Introduction to OLS with panel-corrected standard errors
We use a regression methodology called OLS with Panel-corrected Standard Errors. This
methodology corrects the standard errors that the standard OLS estimates incorrectly for a panel data.
As has been explained earlier, time-series-cross-section data is possibly marked by heteroscedasticity of
the errors and dependence of error processes upon each other. The latter has two aspects- i) serial
correlation: errors for a particular unit at one time are related to errors for the same unit at other times
ii) spatial correlation: errors for one unit are related to errors for every other unit. Since panel data
possibly has these characteristics, OLS is unable to correctly calculate standard errors. In absence of
correct standard errors, the variability of parameter estimates is not calculated correctly. Additionally, it
will lead to incorrect computation of confidence intervals and statistical tests. Thus, it leads to either
over-confident estimation or insufficiently confident estimation of the coefficients of the regressors.
To address this, Beck (1995) propose OLS with panel-corrected standard errors [36]. The standard
Time Series Cross-Section model is given by:

- 4.4.1.1
In the equation 4.4.1.1, observations are indexed by unit (i) and time (t), xi,t is a vector of regressors,
and 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 are error terms. In Beck's paper, The NT x NT covariance matrix of error terms with a typical
element E( 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 , 𝜖𝑗,𝑠 ) is represented by Ω. Likewise, the matrix for the independent variables for all the
observations is represented by X and that of dependent variables for observations is represented by Y.
Then the standard OLS estimates for 𝛽 is given by

-4.4.1.2
The estimated covariance is:
-4.4.1.3
But the covariance matrix Ω is generally not known.
Beck argues that the correct formula for OLS estimates is given by the square roots of the diagonal
terms of

-4.4.1.4
Beck (1995) write that when the errors obey the spherical assumption, the above equation simplifies to
the standard OLS formula, where the standard errors are the square roots of the diagonal terms of
𝜎̂ 2 (𝑋 ′ 𝑋)−1 , where 𝜎̂ 2 is the OLS estimator of the common error variance, 𝜎 2 . In case of time-series data,
the standard OLS methodology does not work. But equation 4.4.1.4 can be used to deduce accurate
panel-corrected standard errors. In this scheme,Ω is "an NT x NT block diagonal matrix with an N x N
matrix of contemporaneous covariances, ∑, along the diagonal" [36]. To estimate equation 4.4.1.4, it is
necessary to estimate ∑, which is given by:

-4.4.1.5
̂ is formed by "creating
In the above equation, 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is the OLS residual for unit i at time t. The estimator Ω
̂ matrices along the diagonal" [36].
a block diagonal matrix with the ∑

To test the accuracy of this regression methodology, Beck (1995) employ Monte Carlo
experimental analysis. The observations on independent variables, xi,t for i=1,…,N and t=1,…,T, are
"generated as random draws from a zero-mean normal distribution" [36]. For a given N (number of
units) and T (time units), one thousand replicates of the NT error terms are generated as "zero-mean

NT-variate normals, with standard deviations chosen so that estimated coefficients were roughly twice
their standard errors" [36]. Using the one thousand independent variables (xi,t) and one thousand error
terms (∈𝑖,𝑡 ), one thousand replicates of dependent variable i.e. yi,t are generated. Then, the accurate
measure of the variability of each estimator is the standard deviation of the one thousand 𝛽 𝑙 s. The
quality of the given methodology is measured by the following calculation:

𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 100

̂𝑙
̂̅ 2
√∑1000
𝑙=1 (𝛽 − 𝛽 )
̂𝑙 2
√∑1000
𝑙=1 (𝑠. 𝑒. (𝛽 ))

With this methodology, Beck (1995) calculate the following where the number of units is fixed at 15 and
the number of time points is referred to as T:

It can be seen in the above table that for the OLS with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE), the
standard errors were less than 10% of true variability for various permutations of heteroscedasticity and
spatial correlations.

We also conclude, therefore, that OLS with panel-corrected standard errors is a suitable methodology
for our data. Next we undertake the regression based on it.

4.4.2 Results from OLS with Panel-corrected Standard Errors

An example of a basic OLS with panel-corrected standard errors is given in Table 4.3. Although
we find that FDI inflows and the Liberal Democracy Index, v2x_libdem, is not significant, we find that
remittances is significant. It shows that increasing the percentage share of remittances on GDP by one
unit lowers ethnic tension by 0.04 points. Thus, remittances tend to reduce ethnic tension. This is a
significant result since it illustrates the positive impact of remittances on ethnic tension.

Table 4.3: OLS with Panel Corrected Standard Errors
(1)
Ethnic Tension
Remittances as share of GDP(% of GDP)
0.0393***
(0.00317)
FDI Net Inflows(% of GDP)

-0.00145
(0.000947)

GDP converted by Purchasing Power Parity

0.0000105***
(0.00000140)

Corruption

0.232***
(0.0475)

lexclpop

-2.079***
(0.152)

Electoral democracy index

0.118
(0.121)
3.273***
(0.0821)
3003

Constant
Observations
Standard errors in parentheses

*

p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Likewise, we see that corruption reduces ethnic tension. Specifically, an increase in corruption
by 1 point reduces ethnic tension by .23 points. This seems counter-intuitive but providing a reason for
the effect of each of the regressors on the dependent variable is beyond the scope of this project. We
also see that an increase in GDP by one unit decreases ethnic tension by 0.000015 points. Finally, an
increase in the lexclpop (marginalized group population as a fraction of ethnically relevant population in
a country) increases ethnic tension by 2 points. Similar results are seen when we replace the Electoral
Democracy Index with the Liberal Democracy Index.
Next we perform this version of OLS by segregating the list of countries on the basis of variance
in ethnic tension over the years under consideration and deviation from global mean for all time
periods.
4.4.2.1 Segregation based on variance in ethnic tension
Since ethnic tension has little variance over time (as shown earlier by the fact that the maximum
standard deviation for ethnic tension in our sample is 1.8), we wanted to inquire whether or not the
difference in variability of ethnic tension affects results systematically. For this purpose, we segregate
countries into two groups- one whose range of ethnic tension is less than or equal to 2, and the other
whose range of ethnic tension is greater than 2. There are 85 countries which belong to the first
category indicating that majority of the countries have little variance in ethnic tension. There are 40
countries that belong to the latter category. This division based on range (maximum minus minimum)
was the simplest method of observing variance. The selection of "2" as a specific marker for
categorization is simply a matter of choice and does not follow any standard literature recommendation.
Table 4.4 illustrates the results for the two categories.

Table 4.4: OLS with Segregation based on Variance
(1)
(2)
Ethnic Tension
Ethnic Tension
Remittances as share of
0.0523***
0.0125**
GDP(% of GDP)
(0.00316)
(0.00412)
-0.00670***

0.00409**

(0.00119)

(0.00134)

0.0000115***

0.00000724***

(0.00000126)

(0.00000181)

Corruption

0.190***
(0.0488)

0.300***
(0.0330)

Lexclpop

-2.427***
(0.163)

-1.103***
(0.194)

0.448**

-0.880***

(0.145)

(0.128)

3.356***
(0.109)
2022

3.306***
(0.0775)
981

FDI Net Inflows(% of
GDP)

GDP converted by
Purchasing Power Parity

Electoral democracy
index

Constant
Observations
Standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Whereas the estimated coefficient for remittances in the first category is 0.05, the same in the
second category is 0.012. The tendency for the estimated coefficient for remittances to be higher in the
first category than the second is seen across alternations in the models. This can be seen in Appendix A.
Thus we conclude that compared to the countries that have institutional setups that contribute to
higher variance in ethnic tension, remittances have more positive effect in terms of lowering ethnic
tension in countries that have unknown institutional setups that contribute to less variance in ethnic

tension. To our knowledge, this result has not been observed in any earlier literature. It establishes a
direct causal relationship between remittances and ethnic tension.
There are other key observations that can be seen consistently across the models. Whereas we
discuss these from the above observation, the consistency can be confirmed from the tables in Appendix
A. First, all the variables including the democracy indices and FDI Inflows, which were in earlier models
seen to be insignificant, are significant at 0.05 alpha level at the minimum. Second, corruption
consistently has higher impact in countries in the second set of countries that have the range of ethnic
tension higher than two. In other words, for countries that have higher variability in ethnic tension,
corruption has more significant impact. This is another significant observation that we have not seen in
any other literature. Interestingly, the coefficients of corruption in both sets of countries are seen to be
positive, which means that increase in corruption lowers ethnic tension. For example, in the Table 4.4,
we see that for the first set of countries with range less than or equal to 2, the coefficient on corruption
is 0.19, whereas for the second set with range greater than 2, the coefficient is 0.3. Since discussing the
channels is beyond the scope of this work, we refrain from speculating the reason for this. But this
provides an avenue for further work to discover the channels via which increase in corruption might be
counter-intuitively lowering ethnic tension.
4.4.2.2 Segregation based on Global Mean

We also segregate the sample into two categories based on the global panel mean, which is
4.001. The first category consists of countries whose mean is less than or equal to the panel mean and
the second category includes those countries whose mean is greater than the panel mean. There are 60
countries in the first category and 65 countries in the second category. Since ethnic tension is higher for
those with lower index value, it means that the countries in the first set are characterized by higher
ethnic tension than those in the second set. The OLS results below is from the primary model:

Table 4.4: OLS with Segregation based on Mean
(1)
(2)
Ethnic Tension
Ethnic Tension
Remittances as share of
-0.0232***
0.00885***
GDP(% of GDP)
(0.00486)
(0.000902)
-0.00205***

-0.0000106

(0.000532)

(0.000314)

-0.00000810***

-0.00000472***

(0.00000154)

(0.00000115)

Corruption

0.116***
(0.0350)

0.0527
(0.0282)

lexclpop

-1.230***
(0.124)

-1.087***
(0.133)

0.243**

0.317***

(0.0845)

(0.0636)

2.984***
(0.0801)
1466

4.719***
(0.0497)
1537

FDI Net Inflows(% of
GDP)

GDP converted by
Purchasing Power Parity

Electoral democracy
index

Constant
Observations
Standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

The most important result that we can see in the above table is that remittances has a negative
coefficient for the first set of countries and a positive coefficient for the second set of countries. This can
be seen consistently across all the models, which are gathered in Appendix B for reference. It means
that for countries that have high ethnic tension, remittances tend to increase ethnic tension. On the
contrary, for those with low ethnic tension, remittances tend to lower ethnic tension. This is yet another
extremely significant observation that to our knowledge has not been observed in any existing
literature. It attests to the varying role of remittances depending on the pre-existing scenario of ethnic
tension and has major policy implications, which we discuss briefly in the Chapter 5.

There are several other key observations that we can make from the above figure. First, all the
variables are significant for the first set of countries, whereas in the second set, FDI inflows and
corruption are not significant. This is consistent across alternative models. Even when we remove the
FDI inflows, corruption is still seen to be not significant for the second set. This implies that for countries
experiencing low ethnic tension, there are institutional factors that contribute to lack of significance of
corruption and FDI inflows. The second key observation that we make from Table 4.4 is that GDP has
negative coefficient across the samples. This means an increase in GDP tends to increase ethnic tension.
In the Introduction section, we discussed the channels of remittances-inequality-ethnic tension,
remittances-corruption-ethnic tension, and remittances-government expenditure-ethnic tension. We
saw that the theoretical effect of remittances on ethnic tension via each of these channels is
indeterminate. We saw that some mechanisms in each of these channels lead to increase in ethnic
tension, whereas some lead to decrease in ethnic tension. As per the results in 4.4.2, we see that which
of these competing mechanisms dominates depends on the existing level and situation of ethnic
tension. Additionally, given that there could be other mechanisms affecting the relationship between
remittances and ethnic tension, the results of section 4.4.2 indicate that these mechanisms are also
affected by the pre-existing unique characteristics of ethnic tension.

5
Conclusion
This work shows that remittances has different effects on ethnic tension depending on the
country. This has major policy implications. Countries that already have high ethnic tension need to reevaluate the benefits that they receive from remittances. They might be better off pro-actively creating
employment opportunities within their country to cut down need among their citizens for emigration.
Likewise, foreign countries or global institutions such as the UN that intend to address ethnic conflicts in
a specific country may need to discourage emigration.
This work also has further academic scope. Even though we theoretically discussed possible
channels through which remittances affects ethnic tension, we did not attempt to statistically pinpoint
or evaluate the channels. A further topic of research is investigating the channels via which remittances
lowers ethnic tension in countries that already have low ethnic tension and increases ethnic tension in
countries that already have high ethnic tension. Likewise, another topic of research is investigating the
channels because of which remittances has more significant effect in lowering ethnic tension in
countries that have lower variance of ethnic tension than in those that that higher variance. These
questions shed light on the exact channels that need to be addressed in terms of policy applications. We
have, additionally, discovered several other topics of future investigation. These topics can be
summarized by the following questions: What cause FDI inflows and corruption to be significant for
countries with high ethnic tension? What cause these variables to be not significant for countries with
low ethnic tension? How does increase in GDP increase ethnic tension? How does corruption impact
countries with varying range of ethnic tension? Does increase in corruption necessarily increase ethnic
tension? Why does increase in corruption lower ethnic tension for some countries?
We can also infer from this study that remittances can have different effect on other sociopolitical variables aside from ethnic tension depending on the pre-existing variations in institutional

factors of the countries being studied. This indicates the importance of treating each country as a
unique observational sample with its own socio-political, cultural, and economic factors.
In conclusion, our study uniquely shows that remittances has different effects on ethnic tension
and by extension, on ethnic conflict. The results discussed in the main body of the paper and the
implications explained in this concluding section shows the necessity for further theoretical and
empirical study of the relationship between these variables.

Appendices
Appendix A
Segregation based on Variance 1
(1)
(2)
Ethnic Tension
Ethnic Tension
0.0544***

0.0121**

(0.00301)

(0.00433)

-0.00675***

0.00380**

(0.00120)

(0.00124)

0.0000103***

0.00000716***

(0.00000109)

(0.00000179)

Corruption

0.168**
(0.0511)

0.297***
(0.0351)

lexclpop

-2.381***

-1.057***

(0.159)

(0.196)

0.641***

-0.727***

(0.156)

(0.156)

3.386***

3.152***

(0.110)

(0.0733)

2022

981

Remittances as share of
GDP(% of GDP)

FDI Net Inflows(% of GDP)

GDP converted by Purchasing
Power Parity

Liberal democracy index

Constant
Observations
Standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Segregation based on Variance 2
(1)

Remittances as share of
GDP(% of GDP)

FDI Net Inflows(% of GDP)

GDP converted by Purchasing
Power Parity

Corruption

exclpop

Electoral democracy index

Constant

Observations
Standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

(2)

Ethnic Tension

Ethnic Tension

0.0544***

0.0134**

(0.00335)

(0.00410)

-0.00694***

0.00406**

(0.00117)

(0.00134)

0.0000120***

0.00000706***

(0.00000126)

(0.00000177)

0.187***

0.303***

(0.0490)

(0.0329)

-2.658***

-1.197***

(0.159)

(0.192)

0.530***

-0.879***

(0.142)

(0.126)

3.296***

3.302***

(0.104)

(0.0757)

2022

981

Segregation based on Variance 3
(1)

Remittances as share of GDP(%
of GDP)

FDI Net Inflows(% of GDP)

GDP converted by Purchasing
Power Parity

Corruption

exclpop

Liberal democracy index

Constant

Observations
Standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

(2)

Ethnic Tension

Ethnic Tension

0.0566***

0.0130**

(0.00319)

(0.00429)

-0.00696***

0.00377**

(0.00117)

(0.00123)

0.0000106***

0.00000699***

(0.00000109)

(0.00000174)

0.164**

0.300***

(0.0513)

(0.0351)

-2.618***

-1.151***

(0.156)

(0.195)

0.716***

-0.728***

(0.153)

(0.155)

3.345***

3.147***

(0.107)

(0.0723)

2022

981

Segregation based on Variance 4
(1)

(2)

Ethnic Tension

Ethnic Tension

0.0795***

0.00212

(0.00499)

(0.00472)

-0.00854***

0.00372**

(0.00142)

(0.00114)

0.0000174***

0.00000678***

(0.00000135)

(0.00000178)

0.243***

0.262***

(0.0552)

(0.0350)

0.157***

-0.381***

(0.0365)

(0.0526)

0.903***

-0.625***

(0.180)

(0.103)

2.316***

3.458***

(0.0920)

(0.114)

2022

981

Remittances as share of GDP(%
of GDP)

FDI Net Inflows(% of GDP)

GDP converted by Purchasing
Power Parity

Corruption

egippop

Electoral democracy index

Constant

Observations
Standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Appendix B
Segregation based on Mean 1
(1)
(2)

Remittances as share of
GDP(% of GDP)

FDI Net Inflows(% of GDP)

GDP converted by
Purchasing Power Parity

Corruption

lexclpop

Liberal democracy index

Constant

Observations
Standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Ethnic Tension

Ethnic Tension

-0.0229***

0.00933***

(0.00491)

(0.000830)

-0.00206***

0.0000942

(0.000530)

(0.000307)

-0.00000866***

-0.00000506***

(0.00000156)

(0.00000116)

0.115**

0.0503

(0.0353)

(0.0275)

-1.227***

-1.134***

(0.123)

(0.142)

0.254**

0.301***

(0.0821)

(0.0613)

3.019***

4.775***

(0.0762)

(0.0559)

1466

1537

Segregation based on Mean 2
(1)

Remittances as share of GDP(%
of GDP)

FDI Net Inflows(% of GDP)

GDP converted by Purchasing
Power Parity

Corruption

exclpop

Electoral democracy index

Constant

Observations
Standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

(2)

Ethnic Tension

Ethnic Tension

-0.0222***

0.00895***

(0.00472)

(0.000913)

-0.00228***

-0.00000304

(0.000526)

(0.000314)

-0.00000728***

-0.00000482***

(0.00000159)

(0.00000114)

0.114***

0.0528

(0.0346)

(0.0281)

-1.443***

-1.115***

(0.137)

(0.137)

0.265**

0.325***

(0.0810)

(0.0634)

2.979***

4.714***

(0.0793)

(0.0491)

1466

1537

Segregation based on Mean 3
(1)

Remittances as share of
GDP(% of GDP)

FDI Net Inflows(% of GDP)

GDP converted by Purchasing
Power Parity

Corruption

exclpop

Liberal democracy index

Constant

Observations
Standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

(2)

Ethnic Tension

Ethnic Tension

-0.0219***

0.00944***

(0.00476)

(0.000843)

-0.00229***

0.000105

(0.000525)

(0.000307)

-0.00000777***

-0.00000516***

(0.00000163)

(0.00000115)

0.114**

0.0503

(0.0349)

(0.0275)

-1.439***

-1.162***

(0.137)

(0.146)

0.267***

0.309***

(0.0806)

(0.0609)

3.019***

4.772***

(0.0759)

(0.0555)

1466

1537

Segregation based on Mean 4
(1)

Remittances as share of GDP(%
of GDP)

FDI Net Inflows(% of GDP)

GDP converted by Purchasing
Power Parity

Corruption

egippop

Electoral democracy index

Constant

Observations
Standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

(2)

Ethnic Tension

Ethnic Tension

-0.0203***

0.00576***

(0.00483)

(0.00128)

-0.00161**

-0.0000288

(0.000514)

(0.000321)

-0.0000112***

-0.00000440***

(0.00000153)

(0.00000121)

0.132***

0.0409

(0.0362)

(0.0313)

0.647***

-0.0914***

(0.0365)

(0.0216)

0.360***

0.475***

(0.0727)

(0.0714)

2.213***

4.629***

(0.0727)

(0.0511)

1466

1537

Segregation based on Mean 5
(1)

Remittances as share of GDP(% of
GDP)

FDI Net Inflows(% of GDP)

GDP converted by Purchasing
Power Parity

Corruption

egippop

Liberal democracy index

Constant

Observations
Standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

(2)

Ethnic Tension

Ethnic Tension

-0.0199***

0.00624***

(0.00485)

(0.00134)

-0.00163**

0.000152

(0.000512)

(0.000299)

-0.0000120***

-0.00000478***

(0.00000149)

(0.00000121)

0.131***

0.0390

(0.0367)

(0.0306)

0.642***

-0.0875***

(0.0364)

(0.0209)

0.375***

0.440***

(0.0715)

(0.0629)

2.269***

4.703***

(0.0754)

(0.0603)

1466

1537
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